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This paper investigates when trade facilitation reform 
should be undertaken at the regional level. First, looking 
at both efficiency and implementation considerations, 
it confirms the perception that the regional dimension 
matters. Investigating where efficiency gains can be 
made, this research explains why national markets alone 
fail to produce the full scale economies and positive 
externalities of trade facilitation reform. Second, because 
trade facilitation policies need to address coordination 
and capacity failures, and because of the operational 
complexity challenge, the choice of the adequate 
platform for delivering reform is crucial. The lessons are 
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that regional trade agreements offer good prospects of 
comprehensive and effective reform and can effectively 
complement multilateral and national initiatives.
   However, examples of implementation of trade 
facilitation reform in regional agreements do not seem to 
indicate that regional integration approaches have been 
more successful than trade facilitation through specific 
cooperation agreements or other efforts, multilateral or 
unilateral. Customs unions may be an exception here, 
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‡ Economic Adviser, DFID and Research Fellow, Groupe d’Economie Mondiale. jc-maur@dfid.gov.uk.  Trade facilitation reform is the sum of efforts undertaken at the national, regional and 
multilateral level designed to reduce trade transaction costs. Multilateral discussions on trade 
facilitation have stepped up recently with negotiations in the WTO: until then trade 
facilitation was addressed in the GATT in a relatively modest fashion. Other multilateral 
instruments getting into more detail, such as the Kyoto Convention, have not mustered 
enough momentum for reform. In parallel to multilateral efforts, recent regional trade 
agreements have gradually incorporated trade facilitation dimensions (Moïsé, 2002).
4 
However, to date, a majority of trade facilitation efforts are undertaken unilaterally, the latter 
including by low and middle income countries that were thought to lack the capacity to do 
so.
5   
 
While multilateral, regional and national interventions might be competing to achieve 
identical aims, they more likely coexist because of their complementarities, and by virtue of 
the specific comparative advantages of each approach. However, in discussions about trade 
facilitation reform, the regional dimension has not been the object of as much attention as 
national and, recently, multilateral reform. Besides, when regional approaches to trade 
facilitation reform have been envisaged, for instance in the context of development banks 
regional work, or in regional trade agreements, the rationale for the regional dimension of 
reform is not always clearly expressed. We also suspect that in many instances a narrow focus 
on standalone reforms has prevailed over more holistic approaches. Of course there are 
exceptions. 
 
This paper focuses on investigating more thoroughly how regional initiatives can contribute 
to trade facilitation reform. As international trade and the costs associated to it involves 
activities beyond a single border, the question of where the optimal level of policy 
intervention lies – unilateral, regional or multilateral – needs to be examined. This requires 
the application of two tests.  First a “market failure” test, to assess whether regional public 
intervention will deliver a welfare maximizing reform. Because markets are imperfect, 
governmental intervention is sometimes needed to deliver the optimal social outcome. When 
market failures cannot be remedied at the national level, addressing this becomes a 
transnational issue and collective action is needed; regional solutions shall be sought when the 
failing markets correspond to some well-defined set of nations.  
 
                                            
4 We should note with different motives in sight than the ones underpinning the WTO negotiations. 
5 An example is Senegal, who devised their own basic electronic single window system. Over 80 countries have 
also implemented ASYCUDA electronic customs modules provided by UNCTAD. 
  2Secondly, a “subsidiarity” test needs to be applied, by which actions to achieve a given policy 
objective should be taken at the lowest level of government capable of effectively addressing 
the problem at hand (Sauvé and Zampetti, 2000). Ideally this level of action should 
correspond to the level affected by the need to provide the regional good, meaning that the 
political jurisdiction matches the economic domain of benefits. Thus the most appropriate 
participants will partake in the provision of regional trade facilitation and transaction costs 
will be economized (Arce and Sandler, 2002).  
 
Our working hypothesis is that in some instances regional solutions, by contrast to purely 
national or multilateral ones, will offer the best prospect for meaningful trade facilitation 
reform. In essence, this paper explores when regional trade facilitation reform should be 
undertaken (the economic case), but also when or how this could be undertaken (the 
implementation issue). 
 
With what some perceive as the limits of multilateral trade negotiations, in particular in 
relation to development and implementation issues, eyes turn again towards regional 
solutions. This research does not put itself in this perspective, but rather aims at 
understanding better how regionalism - a force that cannot be denied - can ideally 
complement and contribute to the facilitation and liberalization of trade. 
 
This paper sets itself in the direct continuation of the broad investigation into regionalism by 
the World Bank, a research that was summarized in Schiff and Winters (2003). The specific 
topic of trade facilitation, although mentioned in various outputs of this research program did 
not however receive full treatment. In an earlier work the authors provide insight into the 
relevance of regional trade agreements for several policies, among them transport, itself an 
element of trade facilitation. They note, as we do in detail below, that “… in the presence of 
economies of scale or inter-country externalities, market solutions are generally sub-optimal, 
and failing to cooperate can be very costly . However, regional cooperation is not the same as 
regional integration, and, indeed, there is generally rather little connection between them” 
(Schiff and Winters, 2002).
6 This remark alludes to the two main dimensions of regional trade 
agreements investigated in this paper. First, from an economic perspective, under what 
circumstances regional initiatives are optimal given market failures affecting the supply of 
trade facilitation services? Secondly do regional approaches offer better and more cost-
effective prospects than other institutional solutions to achieve the objective of trade 
facilitation reform?  
                                            
6 On the substantive differences between regional trade and cooperation agreements, see Devlin and Estevadeordal 
(2004).  
  3 
THE ECONOMIC CASE 
We start by defining what we mean by trade facilitation. There is no universal understanding 
of what trade facilitation is (Wilson et al., 2002), reflecting differences, as well as some 
evolution, in views of what should be the reforms undertaken to reduce the cost of trading. In 
simple terms trade facilitation can be thought as the simplification of the trade interface 
between partners. This trade interface is composed in a broad sense of compliance to 
government rules by traders, enforcement by authorities of these rules (including taxes), 
exchange of information, financing, insurance, ICT and legal services, transport, handling, 
measurement and storage. We focus therefore in the rest of this paper on this broad 
conception of trade facilitation as the private and public interventions that help goods cross 
borders.   
 
Government interventions in all these aspects of the trade interface affect the magnitude of 
transaction costs incurred by traders. For example, the sheer diversity of government 
regulations, and the replication of their enforcement causes duplication (e.g. compliance cost 
with two different standards: Baldwin, 2000) and friction costs (e.g. time lost because of 
repeated loading and unloading of merchandise) that regional harmonization and cooperation 
could conceptually help address (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 82). 
 
  The relevance of geography for the tangible and intangible dimensions of the supply 
chain 
Country borders create costly obstacles to international trade. The empirical reality of the 
“border effect” is demonstrated by the gravity model of international trade (for a recent 
overview see: Anderson and Wincoop, 2002). Trade flows between pairs of countries are 
proportional to their Gross Domestic Product and inversely proportional to the trade barriers 
between them. It is well known from this literature that trade transactions are determined by 
geography, and more broadly of non-policy elements that draw two countries closer: It is 
customary to include indicators of geographic proximity such as distance and common 
borders and of broader indicators of proximity such as commonality of language, legal 
systems, history, etc. Some barriers to trade facilitation are associated with these “natural 
barriers” which have a lot to do with geography. 
 
Components of the international trade interface are intangible (payments for instance), and 
others are tangible (physical transport). Looking first at the tangible aspects of the 
international supply chain, it is relatively straightforward to identify components affected by 
  4geography: transport; storage; and physical inspection and presentation of documentation at 
border agencies. Taking the example of transport, international road shipping involves border 
crossing, and transit through neighboring countries. Road and rail transporters have to meet 
possibly different local legal regimes and standards. Different transport standards, such as 
varying maximum axle loads permissible for trucks (Namibia, Zambia, Botswana),
7 or 
changing rail gauges width for trains necessitates unloading and reloading and disrupt the 
supply chain.
8 Compliance with different regulations at each border increases compliance 
costs and add to the time spent there. 
 
Enforcement of border agency controls is highly localized, often near border crossings 
(although not all controls are). When crossing several borders, costs have to be incurred many 
times if customs do not cooperate (at the border of the originating and destination country, 
and of countries of transit). Arvis et al. (2007) talk of “triple clearance time” because of 
duplicating lengthy clearances on most transit corridors in least developed countries. The cost 
of duplication is also magnified by the number of regulations affecting trade implemented by 
border agencies, including entry visa requirements, technical and phytosanitary standards, 
security checks, tax levying, etc.
9 Such requirements involve producing paper documentation 
at border posts, storage in bonded warehouses and physical inspections. The tangible 
elements of international trade transactions therefore strongly suggest that costs are 




However, a feature of modern trade facilitation is the elimination of costly physical 
operations. Thus the tangible nature of trade transactions is being reduced: paper work is 
replaced by electronic documentation - de-linking the production of documentation with the 
physical flow of goods (National Board of Trade, 2003) - modern risk management and non-
intrusive techniques reduce considerably the need for physical inspection. One consequence is 
that transport costs become less related to geographical distance. 
 
                                            
7 Röschlau (2003). 
8 Lack of regulatory interconnection of rail systems creates also disruptions. Before its collapse in 1977, the East 
African Community (Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda) had an integrated rail network. In the 1980s the Kenya 
Railways Corporation was transporting twice the volume of freight that it now carries. 
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK
=228424&Projectid=P079734 for more info. 
9 De Wulf & Sokol (2005) give this example: “the United States Customs and Border Protection enforces laws on 
agriculture, alien and naturalization, banks and banking, census, commerce and trade, conservation, copyrights, 
crimes and criminal procedures, customs duties, food and drugs, foreign relations, internal revenue, intoxicating 
liquors, money and finance, navigation, patents, postal service, public building and property, public land, railroads, 
shipping, telegraphs and telephones, territories and insular possessions, transportation, war and national defense, 
and international treaties, statutes, and agreements”. 
10 We discuss this below in the text. 
  5Does this imply that the regional dimension does not matter for intangibles aspects of 
international trade? Not necessarily. The border effect also holds for services (Kimura and 
Lee, 2006). Portes and Rey (2005) show that cross-border equity transaction flows, which, 
because of their intangibility, one could have presumed not to be affected by transaction 
costs, are subject to similar determinants as goods flows. Geography is therefore an issue. 
Regional proximity indeed favors better information flows between traders, shared cultural 
references, and importantly for trade facilitation, practices and common systems developed 
through time. 
 
Implications for trade facilitation reform  
What does this mean for trade facilitation reform? First, since proximity is associated with the 
existence of location-based transaction costs, this could imply that groups of countries who 
incur common local transaction costs could try to address them jointly. In a way this means 
that there are countries with whom it is more “natural” to cooperate with to implement trade 
facilitation than others. Some economies of scale are geography dependent, such as physical 
transport networks. 
 
However, the attractiveness of geographical proximity for trade does not hold for many other 
aspects of international cooperation dimensions of trade facilitation, and the “natural partner” 
may be one far away. Other dimensions of trade facilitation relate to intangible costs. One 
could surmise that for groups of countries that enjoy already high volumes of trade, and that 
presumably already share good knowledge of the trade facilitation impediments arising in 
their trade, would potentially be better placed to undertake reform together than with other 
countries. 
 
In summary, the relevance of proximity can be established for trade facilitation, but it 
provides relatively little guidance in terms of rationale for regional cooperation except 
perhaps a presumption that there is some role for regional intervention. Regional cooperation 
should then be guided by the identification of efficiency gains realized at the scale of the 
region. 
 
There are two main dimensions to the benefits of transnational cooperation, corresponding to 
the specific market or institutional failures faced by countries: first, the realization of 
economies of scale, including by elimination of duplication and increasing competition; 
second through the avoidance of negative and creation of positive externalities among 
neighbors. Obviously, in order to make sense from a regional economic perspective, cost 
  6reduction must either be more efficiently undertaken regionally than say multilaterally or 
belong to costs categories that are incurred only regionally (i.e. on a geographical basis). The 
question of delivery of regional public goods is particularly relevant in this respect. 
 
Realizing socially optimal economies of scale 
With many interventions and parties in the international transport of goods, and possibly the 
crossing of several borders, there is plenty of scope for cost duplication for trade operators. 
An important portion of these costs being fixed, eliminating any duplication will enable 
efficiency gains for firms, but also allow smaller scale operators to access export markets, an 
important aspect for developing countries.
11  Additionally, because some of the procedures 
and services that facilitate trade involve large fixed and possibly sunk costs, full economies of 
scale in the administrative procedures and services to international trade transactions may not 
be realized at the country level, especially in small and poor countries. 
 
Duplication arises because similar requirements must be met repeatedly, but also because 
national rules differ, therefore also increasing search costs and associated uncertainty,
12 and 
creating further opportunities for rent seeking and corruption. COMESA’s regional carrier’s 
licensing system illustrates how duplication can be tackled. The regional license avoids 
having to pay for multiple licenses (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 81). Likewise, inspection of 
goods, if carried out in different places on each side of one border delays trade. Different 
national regulatory requirements force traders to meet two standards instead of one: in 
Tanzania registration requirements for agro-chemical pesticides are burdensome and subject 
to high fees, despite the fact that Tanzania’s market for such pesticides is small and 




Solutions to reduce duplication costs may involve harmonization, forming a common market 
within a customs union, mutual assistance among authorities (an important facilitating 
                                            
11 World Bank (2005: 85) quotes for instance the cost of certification of organic nut production in Moldova for 
export to Germany which can amount to $18,000 per year, a not insignificant amount for firms in poor countries.  
12 Arvis et al., 2007 examine the large impact associated with uncertainty along the supply chain created by non 
harmonised regulations. 
13 The Tanzania certification and testing agency pesticides “… charges relatively high fees to register an agro-
chemical and also requires three years of field testing. It does not recognize the testing done and registration of 
chemicals in neighbouring countries, including Kenya. Hence, there are a broad range of newer, more effective 
and safer chemicals which do not get registered in Tanzania because of the high cost and which are prevented from 
being legally imported from Kenya or other neighbouring countries. The chemical registration revenue imperative 
of TPRI thus appears to take precedence over a feasible solution of mutual recognition of other (including more 
rigorous) testing and registration systems.” 
  7practice for customs valuation),
14 and mutual recognition of rulings (e.g. for transit 
operations) and of certification and testing (e.g. for standards). Such cooperation is not 
necessarily regional or bilateral and can also be achieved multilaterally. It may, however, be 
the case that a large part of these extra costs be better addressed at the regional level because 
of the political economy and complexity of such arrangements (such as mutual recognition) is 
most probably better managed among a limited number of countries. Secondly, 
implementation of cost reduction measures will often involve some form of regional 
cooperation on the ground: for example, the creation of joint border posts enables neighboring 
countries to share facilities, learn from each other and carry joint inspections thus potentially 
reducing cost and time spent at the border.
15 
 
Economies of scale can also be realized on the administrative procedures and private services 
delivering trade facilitation. It is however unclear to what extent there is a scale barrier to 
efficient border administration, including modern practices such as single windows and risk 
management. The cost of collecting customs taxes in Rwanda is relatively low, amounting to 
2.5% of receipts in 2005 with capital costs representing only a small fraction (2.6%) of these 
costs.
16 It is also unclear to what extent compliance with new security measures imposed by 
large developed countries pose a new challenge in that respect. Overall there is good evidence 
that customs reform projects can be self-sustaining through increase in revenues brought by 
facilitation (Moïsé, 2005) suggesting that economies of scale are exhausted at the country 
level.
17 Arguably this tends to rather relate to still relatively modest levels of reform, and in 
particular do not involve many elements of deep integration with trading partners. Although 
customs operations do not seem to be overly subject to important economies of scale in most 
cases, one can nevertheless argue that there are important costs associated with the 
surveillance of borders. A motivation for Norway, Sweden and Finland to sign cross border 
cooperation agreements (starting in 1960) was “division of labor”; i.e. to share the cost of 
individually manning the 1,630 km long border between Norway and Sweden, and the 739 
km long border between Norway and Finland.
18 Small administrations may not be able to 
                                            
14 For a discussion, see Chapter 8 in De Wulf & Sokol (2005). 
15 The benefits of joint border posts should however not be overstated. Practical implementation has proven 
problematic as the incentives for the border agency of each country to cooperate on joint inspection may not exist 
as import and export controls remain very different as incentives to control them (the emphasis is generally on 
imports and their contribution to tax revenue). 
16 Source: Rwandan Customs, http://www.rra.gov.rw/en/about/performance.pdf.  
17 In Mozambique, the investments made during the initial stages of the program were recouped within 14 months 
from additional revenue receipts. In Peru, increased revenue collection has helped solve many funding problems of 
the administration. 
18 See the communication by Norway to the WTO Trade Facilitation Negotiating Group on Border Agency 
Cooperation, TN/TF/W/48, 9 June 2005. In 1995 Norway calculated the savings associated with the two 
agreements: 10 new customs offices would have had to be opened on the Norwegian side of the border.   
100 new customs officers would have had to be employed. This would have cost about 8 million USD in 
additional investment costs and 8 million USD in recurring annual costs for the customs authorities for new 
  8afford all the material and infrastructure necessary. For instance, in the current WTO 
negotiations on trade facilitation, some members have called for “small vulnerable 
economies” to undertake a regional approach to the implementation of some expected WTO 
commitments that will require capacity building and made a specific submission for regional 
trade facilitation enquiry points.
19 
 
Beyond customs operations, many developing countries are too small (and have too small 
markets) to offer the full range of standards conformity assessment, which could thus benefit 
from regional integration (World Bank, 2005: 90). Setting up regional accreditation bodies or 
opening regional markets for accreditation bodies could be a way to provide cheaper and 
better testing, building on scale economies and comparative advantage. Scarcity of technical 
skills
20 is indeed another reason why regional approaches can make sense for countries facing 
serious shortages in these skills, which for modern trade facilitation techniques can become 
an issue. 
 
Backbone services provide crucial inputs in trade transactions: finance and insurance, 
transport and logistics, handling, measurement and communication services. The delivery of 
these services for trade transactions can require a scale of production beyond the national 
borders.
21 Insurance and financial services (letters of credit, guarantees, insurance, etc.) are 
key input to the capacity to trade internationally: national operators in developing countries 
may not provide them or at non-competitive prices. According to EBRD (2003) national 
banking systems do not pool enough capital
22 to underwrite trade transactions. Financial 
guarantees for payments are often not available for small firms to allow them to export.
23  
Similarly, fixed costs and geographic factors confer natural monopoly characteristics to some 
modes of transport (rail and maritime particularly). Ghana’s Growth and Poverty Reduction 
                                                                                                                             
buildings, salaries, etc. Economic operators would have incurred an estimated 39 million USD additional annual 
costs due to longer waiting time and double stops at the border. 
 
19 Communication from Barbados, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands to the WTO Negotiating 
Group on Trade Facilitation, 7 July 2006, document TN/TF/W/129. 
20 An essential piece of the architecture for the enforcement of technical regulations and SPS measures in 
international commercial exchanges is accreditation, which offers an internationally recognized guarantee that 
national processes of assessment of standards conformity can be relied on (Holmes et al., 2006 offer a good 
overview of the question). In Sub-Saharan Africa there was until recently only one accredited expert, located in 
South Africa, able to grant this accreditation. Now three additional experts have been trained, still in South Africa. 
This confirms the view by ILAC-UNIDO (2003) that markets for accreditation and certification bodies in many 
developing countries may be too small. 
21 Arvis et al. (2007) for instance report how advanced logistics services are inhibited by lack of trade facilitation: 
it is often impossible, note the authors, to maintain multi-country inventories or to dodge first clearance and then 
re-export to the gateway country. 
22 Actually payment guarantee systems require less working capital than payments in advance (which are required 
when there is no guarantee) and thus help smaller agents to access international trade. 
23 This has prompted the EBRD and the IFC to create international risk sharing funds in order to provide small 
enterprise with access to trade finance. The risk sharing funds help international banks (confirming banks) cover 
the political and commercial risk faced by local issuing banks when they cover international trade transactions.  
  9Strategy (Ghana National Development Planning Commission, 2005) envisions regional 
cooperation for cross-border road infrastructure development. Regional transport hubs help 
realize economies of scale.
24 For freight transport, the emergence of multi-modal hubs 
(generally located near important existing infrastructure: air, sea or rail) generate important 
economies of scale (through higher utilization of infrastructure), and efficiency gains (through 
competition between modes of transport) compared to point-to-point routes (Müller-Jentsch, 
2002). Transport hubs depend as much, and probably more from the liberalization of regional 
transport services (such as liberalization of cabotage or air traffic rights) than the availability 
of infrastructure. Indeed, transport hubs tend to be geographically mobile, suggesting the 
secondary importance of infrastructure as a determinant of their location.  
 
Lastly, regional approaches to trade facilitation can also aim to create competition. First, 
among regional operators in the international trade transport and logistics chain; this will 
reduce the cost of trading and increase the availability of services to exporters and importers, 
thus contributing to trade creation. Arguably, better than regional competition is competition 
with the world. There are nevertheless arguments in favor of a regional approach. First, it 
does not have to be discriminatory. Also, as seen earlier, transport competition is increased by 
the establishment of regional hubs. The negotiation of bilateral liberalization agreement in air 
and maritime transport is more straightforward than multilaterally. Mattoo and Fink (2002) 
indeed find that more efficient bargaining may be possible in a pluri-lateral context than in the 
multilateral context for services: there is less concern that outsiders will be able to free-ride 
on the reciprocal exchange of concessions than if there were a general MFN obligation. 
Increased competition in trade related services is also largely dependent on some level of 
regulatory cooperation, which is generally more feasible and in many cases more desirable 
among a subset of countries than globally. Competition dimensions matter particularly in the 
context of transit corridors.  
 
Coastal countries can be placed in a situation of monopoly for transit services: an example is 
the transport of oil products to Uganda by the Kenya Pipeline Corporation, which in the 
absence of rail and road transport competitors can charge excessive prices (Uganda DTIS, 
2006).
25 Competition among transit corridors is also desirable and regional agreements 
between more than two countries can create the conditions for the establishment of transit 
agreements competing against each other. The World Bank (2005) reports that transit 
agreements are often governed by unilateral or bilateral frameworks and such arrangements 
                                            
24 For instance air transport hubs avoid having empty cargo on incoming or outgoing freight, a problem for small 
non diversified economies. 
25 Until 1996 this monopoly was even reinforced by government regulation forbidding the transport of petroleum 
by road operators. This restriction is now lifted. 
  10are not conducive to competition. Participants in “tour de role” and 50-50 sharing type 
agreements oppose regional agreements because they want to stave off competition. 
 
Competitive pressures also hold for government agencies. By offering institutional 
mechanisms through which border agencies can exchange information and benchmark each 
other’s performance, regional agreements offer more transparent regulatory competition that 
can foster more efficient border management. However, this is to be balanced with the other 
consideration that economies of scale and specialization justify one approach for the region.
26 
 
Regional negative and positive externalities 
Regional agreements can serve as a policy coordination mechanism to help prevent individual 
countries to opt for national strategies that are fall short of optimal global outcomes. For 
instance, countries of transit trade are often tempted to use trade restricting policies such as 
seeking to set revenue maximizing fees on transit, imposing compulsory transit routes and 
check points, or the use of mandatory securitized convoys. Fees and requirements will be 
above the cost of services provided (this includes the use of roads, provision of security, etc.) 
or strictly necessary for secure transit.
27 In the worst cases motives behind these policies are 
protectionists; often, this is the outcome of absence of consideration
28 of negative 
externalities imposed on neighbors. Such risk is particularly important when alternative 
transit routes are few as this often happens in Africa.
29 Domestic transport infrastructure 
constraints often have regional implications, justifying from an economic point of view port 






congested, transit bond regimes are financially burdensome, rail transit does not offer a 
                                           
th
 
A finding from the diagnostic on transport and trade facilitation in Uganda (Uganda DTI
2006) is that the most important transport and trade facilitation issues are outside of 
country’s direct control. Tanzania and Kenya, its coastal neighbors offer poor trade 
facilitation: the port of Mombasa where 95% of Uganda’s external trade traffic is handle
 
26 The Tanzania DTIS (2005) raises this question about having regional accreditation organisations. In this case, 
the benefits of joint approach seem high enough to justify foregoing regulatory competition. 
27 McTiernan (2006) for instance reports that Benin and Togo charge very high fees for transit which incites 
transport from Lagos to Accra to be done by ship. 
28 Not merely oversight or neglect, but lack of incentives on the country of transit to internalise the costs of more 
efficient transit. 
29 A counter example is Bolivia, which has several access roads to the sea (Schiff and Winters, 2002) 
30 For instance poor road conditions and border crossing procedure between Kenya and Uganda at Malaba have 
made rail and water transport across Lake Victoria a competitive alternative; or because the route between Durban 
and Kampala is more reliable, some traders of high value goods prefer it to much shorter routes to Dar Es Salaam 
or Mombasa (Caron and Reichert, 2001). 
  11competitive alternative to poor road transport and expensive pipeline transport.
31 As Schiff 
and Winters (2002) note, this type of externality is often asymmetric, with landlocked 
countries standing to gain a lot from better transit, when the gains for the coastal partner are 
much smaller (improved access to the internal market). In practice, landlocked countries have 
not gained much from participation in regional trade agreements, and this is likely because 
important trade obstacles have remained (Yang and Gupta, 2005). 
 
Once again, standards and phytosanitary measures provide a further example of possible 
market failure. Weak or absent enforcement of SPS in one country can mean that negative 
consequences can spill over to neighbors, as is the case with Tanzania, where highly 
contagious bovine diseases are not fully under control. In this context Tanzania has agreed 
with SADC neighbors to a 5-year program of vaccination, surveillance and control of animal 
movements (Tanzania DTIS, 2005).  
 
As well as getting rid of negative externalities, creating positive externalities such as network 
effects may substantiate regional intervention. Transport, electronic and other information 
systems networks play an increasingly important role in trade facilitation reform. There are 
positive externalities for neighboring countries to join existing networks rather than 
developing own systems or multiplying bilateral channels of communication and exchange of 
information. The European Union has developed several networks initiatives around 
electronic transit systems (NCTS), satellite information (GALILEO), or Trans European 
Networks on Transport. This concern is also reflected in trade action plans in developing 
countries such as in the Uganda’s recent DTIS which puts emphasis on the use of EDI 
interchange at the regional level, the development of a regional cargo tracking system and the 
interconnection of East African Community’s customs electronic systems (Uganda DTIS, 
2006).  The same issue of interconnection is noted in the case of Mozambique. Mozambique’s 
proprietary customs electronic system is incompatible with Asycuda++, used by 
Mozambique’s Southern African neighbors, and on which they intend to build their exchange 
of electronic information on transit cargo (Mozambique DTIS, 2004). Transport hubs, 
mentioned earlier, also create positive externalities, such as access to multi-modal transport 
platforms. 
 
                                            
31 Arvis et al. (2007) add that because of railways poor performance and unpredictability (Tanzania Railways 
Corporation has an error margin of 4 to 5 days predicting the arrival of any shipment), road transit from Kenya to 
Northern Tanzania has increased by 20% over the last five years. This also explains why 75% of Rwandan trade 
transits through Kenya while 50% transited through Tanzania only 3 years ago. 
  12Box 1. How regional cooperation can help: DTIS recommendations about SPS 
for Tanzania  
 
The 2005 Diagnostic Trade Integration Study conducted in Tanzania under the 
Integrated Framework finds that a regional approach and cooperation for SPS and 
quality standards can: 
•  increase trade through harmonization of standards and mutual recognition 
of conformity systems (avoiding duplication); 
•  spread knowledge and good practices (creating positive information 
externalities); 
•  more effectively manage trans-boundary risks (avoiding negative 
externalities); 
•  serve to realize economies of scale and scope in the delivery of conformity 
assessment; 
•  better enable regional enterprises to comply with extra-regional standards 
where collaboration facilitates international accreditation; 
 
The DTIS recommendations prioritize the following areas of regional cooperation: 
•  Streamlining of regulations (simplification and improved transparency) and 
mutual recognition; 
•  Resource pooling (‘centers of excellence’ for the testing, registration or 
other monitoring of inputs or outputs for specific products such as 
pesticides, condoms or cosmetics); 
•  Multi-country collaboration for problem solving (surveillance and 
contingency planning, but also research, pilot programs and training). 
 
Source: Tanzania DTIS (2005: 91-98) and author 
 
Positive externalities also arise – beyond the mere realization economies of scale described 
earlier – from the provision of international finance and insurance. International provision of 
such services offers the possibility to mutualize risks across a region, and contribute to 
positive network effects, such as linking banks that usually do not do business with each other 
and diffusing skills through the network. The principle of mutualization is applicable for other 
trade related financial instruments specifically relevant to trade facilitation and transit such as 
guarantees for payment of taxes and insurance. COMESA introduced the Yellow Card or 
Third Party Regional Motor Vehicle Insurance scheme which allows traders to purchase 
insurance covering transport in the region (Arvis, 2005). The region also plans to set up a 
regional transit bond scheme. Regional guarantees (to secure the payment of duty and taxes) 
can address the failure of national organizations to set up such systems, because they often do 
not have the sufficient size, have only access to underdeveloped national financial services, 
and international insurers are not willing to face the political and commercial risks of 
developing markets. In Uganda, the cost customs bonds is estimated to add up to 4% to 
import and export costs and a recommendation of the Integrated Framework diagnostic study 
is to use a regional approach to reduce their incidence (Uganda DTIS, 2006). Arvis (2005) 
argues that the lack of a regional customs guarantee explains why transit initiatives to 
replicate the success of the European TIR system have failed so far. 
 
  13We conclude this section by noting that there is a risk for regional initiatives to create their 
own negative externalities. This, for instance, can occur when countries take part in RTAs 
with policies going against trade facilitation objectives. The obvious example is the need for 
rules of origin in the absence of a common external trade regime, which represent specific 
difficulties in for customs enforcement (World Bank, 2005: 68). Another problem can be 
created by the incentives to harmonize RTA members’ practices, ending up in adopting 
higher standards than strictly necessary.
32 Thirdly, there is also the risk of incoherence with 
trade facilitation objectives of the policies agreed when signing the RTA: when adopting the 
East African Community common external tariff, Uganda had to raise its tariff on vehicles 
from 9% to 25% (customs duty and import commission), which increases the cost of transport 
in Uganda (Uganda DTIS, 2006). Finally, regional trade facilitation should not result in trade 
diversion effects. There are two ways in which this can happen. The most serious one is when 
trade facilitation measures have their own discriminatory effect. For most trade facilitation 
measures this is not the case, but it is nevertheless a possibility for several important policies, 
such as mutual recognition and transport infrastructure policies, in the latter case if the 
improvement of one mode of transport (road for instance) is privileged over others. More 
benignly, in a second best world, trade facilitation may simply augment existing distortions if 
these are left untouched. 
 
WHICH PLATFORM TO DELIVER REGIONAL TRADE FACILITATION? 
A public good perspective 
The benefits from regional trade facilitation display public or quasi-public goods properties. 
Public goods indeed vary in their degree of “publicness” (Sandler, 2006) and thus display 
different properties. One reason why it is important to understand these properties is because 
this has a bearing on understanding better how the benefits from regional trade facilitation 
reform ought to be delivered.
33  
 
A public good is a good giving rise to two distinct market failures. The first failure arises 
because of non excludability: providers of the good cannot prevent others from free riding by 
consuming it at no cost. The second failure is caused by non rivalry: the consumption of one 
                                            
32 This is a question that is difficult to assess in practice, but if one takes the example of regional trade agreements 
signed by the European Union, they make clear reference to harmonization to European standards (see Maur, 
2005). Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh (2001) give an example in how European SPS measures can be particularly 
burdensome. 
33 The growing literature on regional public goods offers a general discussion of this. See: Sandler (1998; 2006); 
Estevadeordal, Franz and Nguyen (2004); Cook and Sachs (1999); Ferroni (2002); Arce and Sandler (2002); Kaul 
et al. (2003), and Kanbur et al. (1999). Stålgren (2000) offers a review of the literature. See also Rufin (2004) on 
transport and communication infrastructure, and Holmes et al. (2006) on standards. 
  14unit of the good does not diminish the quantity available for consumption to others, meaning 
that once a public good is provided, all can enjoy it at no or very low cost. 
 
A quick examination then tells us that most of the benefits provided by regional trade 
facilitation are not pure public goods. They are indeed almost all characterized by near total 
excludability. This is clearly the case for transit corridors, transport infrastructure, financial 
and communication infrastructure, networks, authorized traders regimes, and collocation of 
customs services. The only dimension of trade facilitation that seems to be a pure regional 
public good relates to communicable diseases. For the other regional public good dimensions 
of trade facilitation, the full exclusion characteristic has actually positive implications. 
Excludability indeed means that fees can be charged to finance their supply. It seems also that 
once provided, trade facilitation goods are mostly non-rival in nature: new and improved 
procedures or systems can be enjoyed by all at little or no marginal cost (although in some 
specific cases, discrimination might still have to be borne in mind). In essence regional trade 
facilitation is a mostly a “club good”. 
 
Secondly, depending on the type of public good, the capacity of countries, individually or as a 
group, to affect the supply of the public good varies: what in the literature is called 
aggregation technology (Hirschleifer, 1983). In the case of trade facilitation, the specific 
difficulties for the delivery of regional trade facilitation goods are quite varied. In the first 
instance, a regional good could in theory be provided by any country within a region, and thus 
it is desirable for countries to coordinate over this, otherwise one risks to have too much of 
one good. Airports and ports hubs, cost duplication elimination are two illustrations where 
coordination is optimal.
34 A second, different example is the integrity of a customs union, 
which depends on the member with the weakest customs enforcement capacity (this is 
discussed below).
35 In this case, the failure is linked with lack of capacity. Incentives are big 
for customs union members to provide the weakest link with the technology to enforce 
customs disciplines at the higher standard. Third case in hand: networks, but also many other 




In the all these cases, the contribution of each country to the supply of regional trade 
facilitation is to some extent substitutable for the contribution of others and thus creates free 
riding incentives. These have to be addressed if undersupply is to be avoided, and requires 
                                            
34 “Best shot” and “better shot” categories in Kanbur et al. (1999) typology. 
35 “Weakest link” and “weaker link” categories (Kanbur et al., 1999). 
36 This is to build the network. Note on the other hand that the integrity of the network is affected by the 
contribution of its weakest link. 
  15some form of institution building (Arce and Sandler, 2002). However, the type of aggregation 
technology matters as contributions to the total effort are not necessarily equally distributed, 
which alters the free riding incentives of each country. An implication is that despite having 
in common the need for regional intervention, various components of trade facilitation reform 
cannot be delivered using similar approaches. An important remark in this respect is that the 
role of individual countries belonging to a region will vary depending on what type of 
regional public good that needs to be delivered. 
 
The nature of regional initiatives 
The regional nature of the various aspects of trade facilitation reform suggests that regional 
initiatives are in a unique position to help tackle trade facilitation issues (World Bank, 2004, 
2005). There are numerous institutional public and private arrangements that have the ability 
to deliver these regional goods. The most common are regional trade integration agreements 
and regional cooperation agreements. But other arrangements can also supply regional public 
goods, such as public private partnerships (in several transit corridors), regional development 
institutions, or NGOs (Sandler, 2006). The focus here is primarily on regional trade 
agreements, which for reasons discussed below, but also more generally in the literature 
(Devlin and Estevadeordal, 2004) appear to offer the greatest potential for efficient delivery. 
Because trade facilitation involves a wide range of regulatory activities, it makes sense to 
concentrate on institutions that are largely public, such as regional cooperation agreements, 
when we discuss alternatives to regional trade integration.  
 
A fact is that regional trade agreements (except for customs unions) have not included much 
in the way of trade facilitation efforts (Moïsé, 2002), at least until recently; Bin and 
Misovicova (2007) note that the number of agreements covering trade facilitation in Asia and 
the Pacific has significantly augmented in the recent years and that 34 out of 102 signed 
RTAs now include some trade facilitation provisions. The institutional setting of regional 
agreements seems well suited to pursue a trade facilitation agenda. Trade Facilitation indeed 
requires not only the elimination of distortionary and inefficient rules and practices, but 
mostly to carry on an ambitious and positive agenda of reform by implementing 
internationally compatible modern legislation, systems and skills. In essence trade facilitation 
is about deep integration. 
 
  16How RTAs can facilitate trade facilitation 
The World Bank (2005) lists several areas of facilitation in which they view RTAs can lead to 
improvement: alignment of customs codes with international standards; simplification and 
harmonization of procedures (e-documents and single document); alignment of tariff 
structures with the HS; transparency; effective implementation of the WTO valuation 
agreement; joint work towards customs integrity; establishment of joint border posts; and 
joint training centers. A regional approach to some of the items in this list (alignment with 
international standards, transparency) does not obviously stem from any the economic 
advantages discussed above, implying that there is not necessarily a direct correspondence 
between the economic optimal level of intervention and the jurisdictional one: the subsidiarity 
question. The interest of taking such reforms forward in regional agreements is thus not be 
only because of pure economic reasons, but also because regional trade agreements offer 
specific advantages over other forms of international agreements (multilateral or other 
regional forms of cooperation) and unilateral initiatives. 
 
We examine the following characteristics of RTAs: i) a forum to exchange concessions across 
a broad array of sectors; ii) the access to mechanisms of cooperation, including in some 
instances financial transfers and capacity building; iii) a mechanism for political commitment; 
and iv) a more efficient approach to harmonisation and implementation. 
 
RTAs as a forum of issues 
First, deep RTAs offer the possibility of comprehensive trade facilitation, involving reform in 
several sectors of the economy that can be incorporated in the new generations of RTAs.  
Deep integration agreements present the opportunity to include sectors that are not well 
covered multilaterally, while also providing efficient enforcement mechanisms (we treat this 
below). The wider remit of RTAs compared to multilateral approaches (binding such as the 
WTO, or other international organizations with less enforceability such as the WCO, which 
focuses only on customs) is reflected in initiatives such as APEC, which uses of a broader 
definition of trade facilitation reform compared to the relatively narrow approach taken in the 
WTO (Wilson et al., 2002). By incorporating policies for which there is no actual or possible 
prospect multilateral liberalization, some regional agreements offer increased scope for 
meaningful trade facilitation reform. A good illustration of this is the adoption of flexible and 
harmonized policies on visas and opening of services, dimensions usually out of reach of a 
multilateral agreement, but which can be part of regional discussions; ECOWAS, for instance, 
suppressed visas between member countries. The political economy of RTAs makes it easier 
  17to deal with migration issues because countries can exchange commitments on natural 
persons movements (whereas not possible in GATS).
37 
 
By tackling many dimensions of trade facilitation at the same time, regional trade agreements 
also give the scope of exploiting natural complementarities between the different elements of 
trade facilitation reform.
38 A particular challenge of reform is to get all the agencies involved 
in border control to work to a common objective of facilitating trade. This is often not 
happening. By having the policy areas implemented by these agencies (such as SPS and 
standards) covered in a same trade agreement offers scope for agreeing to common aims 
linking these policies. In theory the WTO could offer similar advantages, but there the 
multiplicity of diverging country interests behind each issue makes any attempt at defining a 
coherent approach across them difficult and reduced to the common high level principles of 
non discrimination, transparency or due process, but still a far cry from delivering coherent 
implementation of these policies.  
 
Conceivably all the facets of trade facilitation reform could equally be included in either 
RTAs or specifically designed cooperation agreement. However, RTAs generally offer the 
scope of a wide spectrum of policies across which trading-off concessions (Devlin and 
Estevadeordal, 2004), including non-economic dimensions.
39 Besides, because of this breadth 
of scope, regional trade agreements can also guarantee better commitment. In theory any 
attempt to deny any trade facilitation concession by the imposition of other trade barriers (e.g. 
tariffs) should be more complicated as these are part of the agreement. By the same token, 
enforcement of trade facilitation measures will be guaranteed by the possibility for partners to 
withdraw any other concession. Obviously there many limits to this happening in practice, 
starting with the fact that despite being broad in scope, many existing regional agreements are 




Regional trade agreements are not infrequently complemented by sharing of resources and 
redistribution mechanisms among partner countries, including the supply of financial and 
                                            
37 Although this is only likely when partner countries are have similar levels of development and patterns of 
comparative advantage that make movement of natural persons relatively balanced. Bin and Misovicova (2007) 
find that provisions on mobility of business persons are present in about one third of RTAs containing trade 
facilitation provisions in Asia and the Pacific.  
38 For instance regional guarantee systems help establish global standards for documentary credity (EBRD, 2003) 
and thus generate information that can be used for other purposes. 
39 At the same time this increases the complexity of negotiating across a wide range of issues. 
  18technical assistance. Trade facilitation reforms can be demanding, both in expertise and 
material.
40 Regional efforts offer in addition the possibility of benchmarking (for example the 
regional program for Trade and Transport Facilitation in South Eastern Europe, De Wulf and 
Sokol, 2005: 137) the sharing of good practice. Several regional agreements have a program 
of regional capacity building. This is the case of APEC and COMESA. APEC has developed 
a program of technical assistance for which members have drawn a collective and individual 
Country Assistance Plans covering 16 areas.
41 The European Union devotes rather 
considerable sums and efforts to assisting neighbor countries with which it signs association 
agreements (OECD, 2005). In particular, as discussed earlier, when the provision of better 
trade facilitation at the regional level is impaired by the lack of capacity of a few members, 
with implications as a whole for a regional system, regional groupings will assist the delivery 
of joint assistance (acting as a coordination mechanism and sharing the costs among 
members).  
 
Even in the absence of redistribution arrangements, RTAs potentially create beneficial access 
to external financial resources as they may increase the credibility and ability of the regional 
group to offer loan collateral for instance (Devlin and Estevadeordal, 2004). Regional 
guarantee systems would benefit from this. 
 
Trust and institutions 
It is also well-known that regional trade agreements act as trust building mechanism, favoring 
interactions between officials and exchange of information (Schiff and Winters, 1998). Trust 
is a vital aspect of trade facilitation cooperation, as it helps mitigate risk – and thus reduce 
physical constraints on the transport of goods such as inspections or requirements to abide to 
certain requirements such as compulsory routes – through increased confidence in shared 
information and systems. While regional trade agreements have a good track record as 
enabling trust building across partner countries’ administrations, attempts to involve 
businesses, for instance through public private partnerships have been much less successful: 
                                            
40 This question is the subject of some debate: it is argued that developing countries are actually more advanced 
than commonly thought and that a large share of essential trade facilitation measures would not be that costly and 
that the main hurdle is political. This is for instance the conclusion reached by McLindern (2006), arguably in the 
narrow context of WTO negotiations. On the other hand, there is also evidence that ambitious customs reform 
(often as part of revenue reform) mobilises very significant donor support over several years as in the instance of 
South Eastern Europe. 
41 APEC Sub-Committee on Customs Procedures (2006). CAP Assessment/Evaluation Matrix. September 2006. 
http://www.sccp.org/sccplibrary/Meas_Eval/capeval_0206.htm  
  19for instance the European Union has tried to build ambitious public-private partnerships in the 
context of its European transport network policy, with mixed success.
42 
 
In the context of regional trade agreements, customs cooperation committees are often 
established to discuss enforcement issues and also help diffusing disputes (World Bank, 2005: 
89). More informal expert groups have also been established in regional integration context, 
such as the EU Florence process on infrastructure, which has been influential for promoting 
reform (Rufin, 2004). Also, through harmonization of instruments and increased 
transparency, it becomes easier to understand what trade partners are up to. The establishment 
of trust is central in achieving devolution of responsibilities to partner countries such as in 
mutual recognition and regional guarantee schemes, but also in establishing shared facilities. 
Trust not only matters at the technical level, but of course also at the political one. An 
illustration of the link between trade facilitation and international trust, albeit not in the 
context of an RTA is given by the recent decision by India and China to reopened to trade the 
Himalayan pass of Nathu-La, after four decades of military tension.
43 The trust dimension 
takes an added importance with enhanced concerns about security after the terrorist attacks of 
11 September on the United States. Better security involves better border control, which can 
benefit from regional cooperation.  
 
Regional trade integration implies the building of regional institutions that can take forward 
some policies on behalf of its members. RTAs offer a cost-saving institutional architecture 
(Devlin and Estevadeordal, 2004; Sandler, 2006) through which the demand for regional 
public goods can be more easily aggregated. The redistribution mechanisms discussed above, 
but also the cooperation mechanisms established through a RTA will help both achieving 
better cooperation (limiting free riding in particular) and capacity, all central dimensions for 
the delivery of public goods. It is also often thought that regional institutions are better placed 
to carry forward international harmonization agendas (World Bank, 2005; Consilium Legis, 
2003 also make this argument in the case of transit corridors). Regional representation can 
also be a way to increase the bargaining power of its constituents in international negotiating 
forums such as standard setting organizations (an example of this is for instance discussed in 
EC, 2001 in relation to air and maritime transport standards). Finally, as discussed above, 
pooling scarce resources can mean that regional institutions will become more efficient. 
 
                                            
42 Another way to create ownership with businesses is by giving them access to dispute settlement under the RTA, 
as NAFTA and CAFTA do for investment. Similar solutions could be envisaged in relation to trade facilitation, 
offering the possibility for the private sector to challenge governments that unlegitimately restrict their business. 
43 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/5093712.stm 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1661459.cms 
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Interestingly, RTAs have contributed to create new impediments to trade which require more 
sophisticated trade facilitation measures as administration of border formalities becomes more 
complex because of the need to discriminate between preferential and non-preferential trade 
(De Wulf and Sokol, 2005). It takes more time to process goods covered by regional 
agreements than other (Roy and Bagai, 2005). Thus, while making trade more complex, 
regional agreements have created new trade facilitation needs with the enforcement of 
preferential rules of origin. All this probably explains why most RTAs, to the exception of a 
few deep RTAs, when they include trade facilitation aspects focus on questions of origin 
(Moïsé, 2002) and their enforcement. Too often, RTAs have focused on these elements alone 
rather than explicitly making of trade facilitation an element of regional integration. 
 
On the other hand, Europe views customs (and probably border processes in general) as an 
important tool in favoring regional integration and promotion of preferential links (EC, 2003). 
There are indeed incentives, triggered by the trade creation effects of regional agreements, 
which raise the salience of other aspects of regional cooperation (World Bank, 2005: 92) such 
as trade facilitation. One has however to add that trade diversion may as well diminish the 
relative importance of trade with the excluded parties to the regional agreement. One can for 
instance see that the trade facilitation related policies of Europe have been largely inward 
looking until most recently. This is not so much an issue when the trade volume 
complementarity operates with trade facilitation policies that are not discriminatory in essence 
(such as international harmonization). However it could become one with policies of 
cooperation and mutual recognition or adoption of any standards that exclude certain 
categories of traders. 
 
The focus on enforcement questions in existing RTAs limits the scope of these agreements on 
trade facilitation to few dimensions, which essentially aim at simplifying the job of the 
customs authorities when dealing with goods under preferential access. This includes 
transparency requirements with frequent reference to GATT article X (Moïsé, 2002), the 
adoption of documentation standards (such as the Single Administrative Document in the EU) 
to facilitate the access to information and cooperation between customs authorities for fact 
finding. Harmonization is not much on the agenda, except for better mutual understanding of 
day-to-day operations. 
 
Secondly, when RTAs involve more than two partners, the question of transit management is 
raised. If three countries grant each other preferential access, goods exchanged between any 
  21two members must be able to transit through the third one without added charges and 
impediment to trade that undo the preferential treatment. Thus regional trade agreements 
provide a strong incentive to push forward transit agreements, either within the RTA itself or 
in parallel. As discussed in section 3, despite abundance of provisions on transit, 
implementation remains an issue. 
 
The third facilitation-related element historically prominent in RTAs deals with rules on 
technical standards and phytosanitary requirements. In some occasions, such as within the 
European Union and the Mercosur, an ambitious regulatory agenda has been pursued. 
However, in most cases standards provisions have been much more modest, including in 
RTAs among advanced economies. In the case of the European Union, beyond the upward 
harmonization for the internal market, the most ambitious attempts at facilitation of trade on 
standards have been through standalone mutual recognition agreements (such as the one with 
the USA) and are limited to conformity assessment. One lesson that seems to emerge from 
regional cooperation on standards is that the nature of regional cooperation on standards 
depends on the specific capacity of the trade partners such as preparedness to perform 
conformity assessments, and the institutional setting of the agreement, where depending on 
how strong institutions are, more or less active harmonization or recognition routes can be 
followed (World Bank, 2005: 88). 
 
The recent generation of regional trade agreements seems however to increasingly incorporate 
additional trade facilitation content. Evidence of this is reported for regional agreements in 
Asia that include provisions covering transparency of laws and rulings, use of ICT and e-
commerce, freedom of transit, mobility of business people, facilitation of transport and 
logistics, and facilitation of payment and trade finance (Bin and Misovicova, 2007). 
 
Thus the complementarity between RTAs and what is often their first main objective, the 
reduction of tariffs and quotas, and some aspects of trade facilitation reform create an 
incentive to bring trade facilitation cooperation under the umbrella of an RTA rather than in a 
standalone agreement. As noted by Devlin and Estevadeordal (2004), this complementarity is 
likely to increase with commercial integration, thus expanding the scope of trade facilitation 
intervention in the context of RTAs. This aspect is highlighted by the case of Customs 
Unions. 
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Arndt et al. (2007) suggest that a benefit of opting for a customs union model over a simple 
free trade agreement could be to register more progress on “deep integration” issues such as 
trade facilitation or liberalization of services. We find that this is most likely to be indeed the 
case for trade facilitation. 
 
The preservation of tax revenues is very much at the forefront of customs and other trade 
facilitation related concerns in regional trade agreements. This is in this respect a notable 
difference between cooperation agreements (which are not necessarily signed in the context 
of tariff reductions) and RTAs. For developing countries and even more least developed ones 
trade taxes are a big share of all government revenue (Keen and Simone, 2004). This is why 
emphasis has most often only been on the few aspects of customs that would enable to secure 
trade tax revenues while allowing preferential trade. 
 
The incentives related to optimizing revenue collection are modified in a customs union, 
which we first define broadly as a regional trade agreement with a common external tariff and 
no tariffs among its members.
 44 In a “true” customs union, revenues will be collected at the 
initial port of entry in the customs union. That is revenue is collected by each member on 
behalf of the union and subsequently either redistributed or spent by common institutions. 
This substantive difference between customs union and other regional trade agreements bears 
important consequences on the scope for trade facilitation reform at the regional level. 
 
First, customs unions do not require the implementation of rules of origin among members.
45 
They also either eliminate or diminish the need for transit bond regimes for goods destined to 
markets within the union. Both are significant facilitations of trade. Further, forming a 
customs union implies further incentives for trade facilitation reform in member countries to 
harmonize their regime, starting with adopting common customs legislations, classification, 
and tariff rates. 
 
Like in any other preferential trade arrangements there are incentives for trade deflection in 
customs union, to take advantage of borders in the region where protection is the lowest. 
Because tariffs are uniform, the cause of trade deflection is solely due to non-tariff barriers, 
therefore putting a specific emphasis on them. Among them, lack of trade facilitation in one 
                                            
44 The World Customs Organization (1995) defines a customs union as the union of two or more customs 
territories sharing a common tariff, where customs duties and restrictive regulations of commerce have been 
abolished within the customs union. 
45 At least for “true” customs unions that collect revenue at entry. 
  23partner provides incentives for private operators to concentrate their trading operations in the 
most efficient member of the union: “port shopping” is what happened in Europe (EC, 2003). 
Another characteristic of customs unions is that there is no possibility to change unilaterally 
the external tariff applied to third countries, and eventually compensate tariff revenue losses 
caused by trade diversion. Such revenue losses are one of the chief motives for governments 
to take action.
46 Additionally when revenue is collected by individual members on behalf of 
the Union, and then shared under some revenue sharing agreement - as it is in SACU - 
implies that there is mutual confidence in the enforcement capacity of other union members: 
trade facilitation measures and upgrading of union members border management is an 
element of confidence building. 
 
Therefore in order to preserve the integrity of a union, members have a strong incentive to 
take a joint approach to issues and build capacity at the weakest points of entry of the customs 
territory.
47 These “race to the top” incentives can promote facilitation reform in some 
members. This also means that the prognosis for the provision of weakest link type public 
goods is increased in customs unions, which is confirmed by their generally more ambitious 
trade facilitation undertakings.
48 Members of the COMESA have for example adopted several 
regional trade facilitation initiatives, including a single document for customs and are in the 
process of establishing a regional bond system (see box 2 for further examples in COMESA). 
 
Deeper integration within the Customs Union adds to incentives for trade facilitation. In the 
context of a more integrated markets such as the EU single market, the removal of internal 
borders has meant not only a transfer of sovereignty for tariff revenue collection to the Union, 
but also of all other border controls, and thus a transfer of authority at the European 
Commission level, as well as further incentives to build the capacity of the weakest members 
in the absence of national border controls for goods transiting through other members of the 
Single European Market (EC, 1989).  
 
Note however, that the incentive is rather one of harmonization and enforcement than 
facilitation of trade in the strict sense. In this context there is a clear distinction between trade 
among members and trade with third countries. While intra-union trade is most likely to see 
more benefits from the removal of controls, the harmonization of regulatory requirements, 
                                            
46 Ineffective protection of the domestic industry is the other reason why regional agreement members want to 
avoid trade deflection. One can however assume that governments will be looking after their direct interests (tax 
collection) very closely in any case.  
47 See Keen (2003). 
48 According to Arce and Sandler, regional institutions are already well placed to provide weakest link type public 
goods compared to global institutions because being closer to the problem they can identify more easily the 
“laggards”. As the weakest link problem is one of capacity, the idea seems here that for implementation purposes, 
regional institutions will be more efficient.   
  24and mutual cooperation, effects are likely to be much more ambiguous with countries outside 
the Union. Border reform under customs union is only synonymous of genuine trade 
facilitation to the extent that it makes trade easier among customs union partners and with 
external partners. It is true that the adoption of a unique rule within the union creates 
immediate benefits to third countries such as: an automatic reduction of duplication costs for 
transiters and trading partners dealing with more than one customs union member and access 
to a broader market once the fixed costs associated to border control (such as accessing 
information about customs procedures) are paid. On the other hand, there is a distinct risk that 
process of cooperation among union members in the implementation of their procedures such 
as MRAs will give union economic agents an added competitive hedge against traders outside 
the union that will not have access to these facilitation tools. Another risk of discrimination is 
the adoption of higher standards and stricter procedures by union members on trade from 
third parties leading for instance to standards harmonization and added controls at the border 
to guarantee integrity of borders on behalf of other union members. 
 
Box 2. COMESA’s regional initiatives on trade facilitation 
 
The Common Eastern Market for Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA) 
was formed in 1981 and the COMESA free trade area launched in October 2000. The 
20 member countries of COMESA now plan to launch the COMESA Customs Union 
in December 2008. 
 
Trade facilitation has been an important aspect of regional integration in COMESA. 
The following trade facilitation measures have been developed (not necessarily to all 
member states): 
•  Common tariff nomenclature 
•  Common valuation system 
•  Protocol on rules of origin  
•  COMESA single customs declaration document (COMESA-CD) 
•  Protocol on transit and trade facilitation introducing licensing of transit 
carriers and harmonization of axle load controls 
•  Regional customs bonds guarantee scheme was launched in 2006 enabling the 
payment of a single bond for the region 
•  Licensing of clearing agents and formation of a regional Freight Forwarder 
Association 
•  Protocol of third party motor vehicle insurance scheme (Yellow Card scheme, 
to which 13 countries participate) 
•  Joint border controls (Chirundu port for Zambia-Zimbabwe; Malada border 
for Uganda-Kenya) 
•  Implementation of common standards 
•  Capacity building with development of customs training modules 
 
Source: COMESA (2005) 
 
One should also note that most customs unions do not follow the model of collection of 
revenues at the port of entry, but rather according to the final point of consumption. Arndt et 
al. (2007) survey 9 customs unions and find that only the EU and SACU collect revenue at 
  25entry. This means for the other customs unions the use of complex bond procedures to ensure 
that goods entering the customs union are indeed taxed at their point of destination, as well as 
possibly rules of origin.
49 Trust and more developed institutions are also much less a feature 
of such arrangements, as are incentives to cooperate to upward harmonization. 
 
TRADE FACILITATION REFORM THROUGH RTAS: A SUITABLE OPTION? 
Bergsten (1997), referring to APEC, lists trade facilitation as one of the five possible 
definitions of “open regionalism”. Trade facilitation measures are indeed rarely preferential in 
nature, except when they providing lower customs fees, simplified origin marking 
requirements and mutual recognition agreements of conformity (Moïsé, 2002). Other reforms 
undertaken in the name of trade facilitation in RTAs are de jure non-discriminatory and thus 
their benefit should also extend to non-RTA trade partners (Schiff and Winters, 2003; Maur, 
2005). The possibility however remains that through the adoption of specific standards, an 
artificial advantage is granted to parties better acquainted than others with such standards (a 
hidden motive behind upward harmonization claims promoted by developed countries). This 
is an issue for technical barriers and phytosanitary standards. This probably less the case for 
harmonization of customs procedures, essentially modeled on internationally agreed standards 
(Moïsé, 2002). Implementation issues and necessary cooperation, including mutual 
recognition of practices however raise the spectrum of discrimination against countries 
outside the regional trade agreements. 
 
What channel for regional trade facilitation? RTAs and cooperation agreements 
As noted by Arvis et al. (2007) the lack of reform is not because of lack of legal instruments. 
Regional dimensions of trade facilitation can be addressed through sector-specific bilateral or 
plurilateral cooperation agreements rather than cross sectoral RTAs (thus confirming the view 
that RTAs are not a technical necessity per se, cf. Hoekman and Kostecki, 2000). Regional 
transit agreements are an example of such cooperation agreements.
50 Transit arrangements 
between countries are numerous. Taking the case of Africa, N’Guessan (2003) points out that 
transit systems are particularly deficient. Only 30% of the regional transit in WAEMU is 
conducted under the regional transit agreements, the remaining 70% being subject to bilateral 
rules. Regional corridor agreements in Sub-Saharan African are largely not operational for 
most of the transit traffic, and are superseded by national, non-harmonized, overlapping and 
                                            
49 I thank Matthew Stern for drawing my attention to this fact. For instance in the EAC, a transitory regime will 
ensure that collection of taxes is first made at the final port of destination, as opposed to the port of arrival 
(Uganda DTIS, 2006). 
50 There are several other examples of (generally bilateral) sector specific agreements to facilitate trade: customs 
cooperation agreements and mutual recognition agreements for instance. 
  26discriminatory provisions such as: compulsory customs escort, non-harmonized transit 
charges, or specific country documentation for transit. Administrative burden adds to the 
regulatory burden, with lack of coordination between different agencies in charge of 
controlling transit goods (customs, police, sanitary controls). Inefficiency of these agencies 
multiplies the costs. The conclusion thus seems that neither bilateral sectoral agreements nor 
regional agreements in the context of regional integration have delivered trade facilitation 
benefits in Africa. 
 
One reason why bilateral transit cooperation agreements have not delivered could be the 
absence of incentives by countries to internalize regional externalities: the asymmetry of 
incentives for landlocked and border countries noted by Schiff and Winters (2002). However, 
and more importantly, the lack of political commitment of individual countries behind 
market-based reforms probably remains the biggest impediment. An example is absence of 
liberalization in the transport sector denying the benefits of better transport links and 
corridors. Poor procedures in individual countries of transit, linked to weak political 
incentives to reform, remain often the main obstacle to efficient regional transit regime. An 
interesting case in hand is Djibouti, which has made important port infrastructure investments 
to increase its capacity to serve neighboring countries from its hinterland. To date, the 
capacity of the port terminals remains in some instances largely underutilized. The reason is 
not lack of demand: the Djiboutian port authority has had to increase its dry port capacity to 
store increasing amounts of cargo laying in waiting. Slow border clearance from neighboring 
Ethiopian authorities is the explanation. Cargo ships have to stay longer than necessary, 
preventing full utilization of the terminals. Slow clearance from Ethiopian authorities creates 
a negative externality on port activities in Djibouti, probably an important source of revenue 
for a small economy like Djibouti. This demonstrates incidentally that the policies of 
landlocked countries can also negatively impact on coastal neighbors. 
 
The political commitment problem can be better addressed in the broader setting of RTAs, 
than in other regional institutional settings. The anchoring of reform can be stronger, and the 
cost of non-implementation of one obligation can jeopardize the agreement as a whole, and 
thus is much higher. Dispute settlement measures tend to be stronger in regional trade 
agreement than in sectoral agreements (World Bank, 2005: 86 provides the example of 
standards). This could explain why the alternative to incorporating transit processes into or in 
parallel regional agreement seems to have gained credence in the past decade, when several 
  27agreements have been signed with provisions on regional transit.
51 Indeed, many regional 
agreements have incorporated rules and developed instruments to facilitate transit such as the 
EAC, COMESA or SADC. However, actual transit facilitation has been disappointing mainly 
because of poor implementation (Arvis, 2005 quoting UNCTAD, 2001). With the exception 
of the European TRIE agreement (Transit Routier Inter Etats) most fail to address 
implementation problems and have confined themselves to broad policy recommendations.  
 
The poor record on transit illustrates the more general failure of most regional institutions to 
deliver tangible trade facilitation reform. The EU, and to a lesser extent the APEC being 
among the exceptions. In Africa, Mc Tiernan (2006) reports that only COMESA and the 
trans-Kalahari corridor (an ad hoc transit cooperation agreement) have provoked changes in 
customs practice.
52 Interestingly, COMESA, the EU and APEC are three non traditional cases 
compared to other RTAs. The poor performance of RTAs may seem unexpected. : since 
RTAs have clearly not tried to take a rule setting role - left to international organizations
53 - 
they could have been expected to take a more active role in implementation. Moreover, that 
RTAs have kept clear of the trade facilitation standard setting agenda is a good thing as it 
guarantees MFN treatment: the modern standards adopted are accessible to all. Because they 
are defined internationally, and thus one can presume that domestic interests are not 
influencing their design, international standards should also guarantee National treatment. 
 
The fact that RTAs have not delivered reform in practice needs therefore be questioned 
further. A first remark is that the role of binding rules for implementation is perhaps 
overstated. Finger (2006) reminds us that there is not necessary a need for legal obligation to 
spark trade facilitation reform as many countries have already shown willingness to do so. 
One should however wonder whether the willingness to undertake regional initiatives is the 
same. APEC has no enforcement mechanism and commitments are entirely voluntary. APEC 
has emphasized its focus on policy integration and common principles of reform, while 
organizing the delivery of technical assistance. 
  
A second observation relates, as discussed earlier, to the revenue preservation incentives in 
regional integration. Policies in the transit country are likely to be motivated by tax revenue 
preservation and since revenue collection is often not perceived as complementary to trade 
facilitation, a plethora of controls will be the preferred option. Weak regional institutions also 
                                            
51 Most regional trade agreements incorporate Transport and Trade Facilitation Agreements types (World Bank, 
2005). 
52 Although the trans-Kalahari corridor progress have been hampered by a unilateral decision by Botswana to 
increase road user fees, which resulted in a decrease of traffic (World Bank, 2005). 
53 The World Customs Organisation Kyoto Convention for customs, the International Civil Aviation Authority 
(ICAO), the International Road Transport Union (IRU), the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), etc.  
  28mean that implementation does not necessarily follow transit agreement that have been 
negotiated. On the contrary, in a true customs union because revenues are collected on behalf 
of the union, transiting countries have some incentives this time to facilitate transit trade for 
countries that collect part of their revenue. 
 
Another difference with customs union is often the strength of their institutions which allows 
them to carry more ambitious reforms. Looking at the examples of the EU and COMESA it 
looks certainly the case that bold regional facilitation initiatives have been tabled like the 
regional bond scheme in COMESA, implemented in 2006, and numerous policies in Europe 
such as trans-national information and transport networks, or standards harmonization. 
Whether such policies have resulted in effective facilitation of trade is a question that is 
difficult to answer. While many of these initiatives seem desirable, their implementation 
remains largely unstudied and so is their impact. Besides there is also some evidence that 
these policies have been more complex to implement that initially thought, short of 
expectations in some cases (transit in COMESA), and that in the instance of the European 
Union, many of the higher international standards remain to be implemented. 
 
A last remark is the presence of large advanced countries as a driving force (both political and 
material) behind reform. APEC (Japan, Australia), COMESA (South Africa), and of course, 
European countries. As Schiff and Winters (2003) argue, trade facilitation as a dimension of 
policy integration requires much more than non-discrimination. It needs the rapprochement of 
policies and enforcement; it also needs effective implementation. Making policies more 
compatible undoubtedly involves strong political will to fight against the vested interests in 
border agencies.
54 It also requires a different institutional setting that classical exchange of 
trade concessions. In short, stronger and more permanent institutions than those of 
multilateral trade negotiations are needed because implementation of trade facilitation 
reforms will require at least coordination, and more likely, as discussed, harmonization and 
mutual recognition of rulings. Regional cooperation agreements and RTAs seem more likely 
to deliver institutions that will foster integration, mostly because transaction costs are smaller 
among a few countries than multilaterally (and in general for the delivery of public goods, 
Devlin and Estevadeordal, 2004; Sandler, 2006); in particular regional agreements seem to 
offer the flexibility needed for the design of such institutions and for informal cooperation. 
RTAs further offer compared to sector-specific trade facilitation agreements the benefit of 
stronger political commitment and linkages with several policies facilitating trade. Finally, 
RTAs offer enforceability and resources for implementation. Enforceability of reform 
                                            
54 This is for instance a clear finding from a recent study on the needs, priorities and costs for the implementation 
of a future WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (McLinden, 2006). 
  29commitment does not seem to be such an issue in the case of trade facilitation as the example 
of voluntary commitments with APEC show.
55 Implementation of reform on the other hand 
seems a major challenge for most countries, including richer ones. Availability of funds, time 
and expertise is required for the most ambitious reforms. Again, RTAs including advanced 
countries seem well suited to fulfill capacity building needs, provided that they offer the right 
mix of financial assistance and expertise. 
 
The complementarity of regional solutions with multilateral and national ones 
Regional solutions to trade facilitation should not always be thought as substitutes to 
multilateral, national or other regional interventions but also as complement. Transit corridors 
should probably gain from the involvement of regional trade agreements on top of corridor 
specific institutions such as regional management committees, and more national 
arrangements (Consilium Legis, 2003). 
 
It is also in several instances a fact, that in order to become operational, regional cooperation 
has to rest on international rules and institutions. This is because the need for guarantees 
extending beyond the regional level: we gave earlier the example of accreditation, which 
needs to be guaranteed internationally by one of two global organizations: the International 
Accreditation Forum and the International Laboratory Accreditation Organization (Holmes et 
al., 2006). Likewise the integrity of TIR system is guaranteed by the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe and the International Road Transport Union (Arvis et al., 2007).  
 
Another dimension of complementarity of regional integration agreements and donor 
organizations is likewise illustrated by the Trade and Transport Facilitation in South East 
Europe program, a joint venture between the EU and the World Bank and bilateral donor 
countries.
56 Of course, the private sector, already mentioned, which may operate nationally, 
regionally or globally, is another desirable stakeholder. 
 
Which RTA? How the size of partner countries matters 
Many aspects discussed so far are country specific. Country or country grouping 
characteristics have therefore significant implications for regional trade facilitation. Least 
Developed countries face a set of constraints that require particular attention. First, economic 
size, meaning that economies of scale are less likely to be internalized at the national level, 
                                            
55 Another enforcement issue is between government and private operators, and the need to have fair and 
consistent enforcement of rules, and the right to appeal procedures for traders. 
56 http://www.seerecon.org/ttfse/  
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facilitation instruments (witness the regional enquiry point proposed by Barbados). Size also 
implies that the bargaining position of small countries with more powerful neighbors leads to 
suboptimal outcomes for them. The obvious example is transit. LDCs are over-represented 
among landlocked countries. A solution to this size asymmetry would perhaps be for the 
small country to trade-off concessions in an RTA context by offering market access (in 
services sector for instance) against facilitated transit and better enforcement of rules so that 
transit is not discriminated against (this includes competition in transport). Over-dependence 
on tax revenues is another characteristic of LDCs compared to more advanced developing and 
developed countries. This dependence creates strong incentives against trade facilitation, and 
in particular against sharing any border responsibility with neighboring countries. In this 
respect, an asymmetric regional cooperation may be an advantage, as partnering with a large 
country that is less dependent on trade tax revenue will mean more political support for trade 
facilitation reform. 
 
This raises the question of whether there are specific partners with whom to preferably 
implement trade facilitation reform? There is the complementarity between some aspects of 
trade facilitation and the volume of goods trade: transport infrastructure springs to mind. 
Modernization of trade procedures involves one off fixed costs that will be recouped more 
easily over larger volumes of trade. This obviously applies to the case of transit for 
landlocked countries where often a few transit routes will represent a very large proportion of 
all external trade. 
 
The volume of trade criterion however may fail to address the geographical-determined 
dimensions of trade facilitation as for many countries trade with neighbors is actually too low, 
thus shifting the focus of regional trade where transaction costs are already low, and possibly 
reinforcing existing distortions (Schiff, 2001).
57 A trade potential criterion makes more sense 
and thus incorporates the geography determinants of trade facilitation discussed. 
 
A different question is whether regional cooperation would not be better with partners 
representing a large proportion of world trade? This complementarity can arise for some 
norm-based dimensions of trade facilitation reform: it makes more sense to harmonize 
standards with big world traders as this also means harmonization with this partner’s trade 
partners. In the context of the positive externalities described earlier, it may make sense to 
                                            
57 See for instance Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000) on Arab trade. Another example is the share of trade between 
India and its neighbours. 
  31integrate with hubs at the centre of large trade networks.
58 In a world where production 
processes become more fragmented, this seems the path to follow.
59 The share of world trade 
criteria points out for developing countries towards seeking trade facilitation reform in the 
context of agreements with Northern economies. This presents the added benefit of access to 
higher modern standards, technical assistance and capacity building: an important 
consideration for weak link type public goods. Actually, evidence suggests that RTAs 
involving developed economies contain more detailed and sophisticated trade facilitation 
provisions (Bin and Misovicova, 2007).  
 
The above arguments need however to be qualified with the possible negative effects of 
RTAs mentioned earlier, in particular if trade facilitation measures boost trade diversion 
effects. This seems to reinforce in our view the importance of promoting regional trade 
facilitation measures in the context of regional trade agreements that are not trade diverting to 
start with: an additional argument for choosing partners with a large share of the world’s 
trade.  
 
Finally, there is also the risk that countries with low capacity may not be able to share much 
with countries with sophisticated policies in place, or be invited to implement measures 
beyond what is strictly necessary for them. 
 
Disentangling these dimensions is difficult as there is no automatic prescription as to where 
the most benefits are concentrated and whether any piecemeal approach to trade facilitation is 
advisable. Regarding the latter, I think better not. This thus suggests that a better framework 
for addressing trade facilitation issues might need to rely on either a multilateral approach 
with regional extensions or a hub-an-spoke approach such as the one envisaged in the 
European Partnership Agreements. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Regional interventions matter. Regionalism, specifically regional trade agreements, has 
undoubtedly a role to play to help trade facilitation reform. We find several reasons why this 
should be the case:  
                                            
58 As pointed out by one reviewer, does it make sense for Mercosur to have an agreement on multi-modal transport 
(signed in 1994) among its countries but none with the EU and the US, its main trade partners? 
59 This echoes a point made by Devlin and Estevadeordal (2004) who suggest that such “hub and spoke” 
arrangements allow getting a greater geographical reach and realising economies of scope in the delivery of similar 
multiple public goods to different regions. 
  32-  The existence of regional public goods, because of the presence of economies of scale 
and externalities at the regional level, for instance in the exchange of electronic 
information, or the mutualization of guarantee systems and transit. 
-  The “local” nature of several elements of the trade logistics chain and the inherent 
efficiency of reforming them at the regional level. 
-  The adequacy of regional trade agreements, if appropriately designed, for 
implementation of regional tools facilitating trade: this is because they are well 
designed to address both coordination and capacity constraints facing the provision of 
regional trade facilitation public goods. This means that regional trade agreements 
can deliver several, different, and complementary trade facilitation public goods. 
-  Another advantage of regional trade agreements is when they incorporate deep 
integration dimensions. They are better suited for addressing complex regulatory 
liberalization. In addition, because they can be broad in scope across many policies, 
trade-offs between the many components of the trade logistics chain can be made, 
and offer better safeguards against violations of commitments. 
 
Regionalism can deliver more. This said, there is yet scant evidence of success of regional 
agreements promoting effective trade facilitation. The reasons why this is the case are still not 
well identified and would warrant further research. Political economy consideration certainly 
play a very important role here; one of the reasons behind low political will could well be the 
reliance on trade tax revenue, a very sensitive issue for poor country especially. There might 
thus be strong resistance to facilitate trade with regional partners. Incentives for better transit 
arrangements are quite difficult to address in this respect. 
 
What scope for regional cooperation? RTAs need to shift their focus from reciprocity to 
policy integration and from a narrow vision of border enforcement to one of policy of 
integration into world markets. This entails a broader coverage of trade facilitation issues as 
whole (recent trade agreements seem to move in that direction). 
 
In particular, trade facilitation objectives should be integrated in RTAs with a clear objective 
to make them also more open to third country trade. As we know too well, trade diversion 
means that regional trade agreements are not necessarily guaranteeing welfare gains for 
participants in the agreement, and likely to generate welfare losses for countries excluded. 
Regionalism is also not necessarily a stepping stone towards multilateral trade liberalization. 
Trade facilitation reform can be a force for good in this context if it reduces trade transaction 
costs on trade from all origins. While we offer no clear conclusion as to whether facilitation is 
itself a stepping stone, it indeed looks like a useful and relatively straightforward policy 
  33(probably easier to implement from a political point of view than tariff reform) to moderate 
the trade diversion effects of preferential tariff reduction.
60   
 
We also saw that the diagnostic about the need regional trade facilitation reform is going to 
differ depending on the absolute and relative size of countries under consideration. While 
some criteria helping to discern how regional trade facilitation could be delivered were 
identified, further work is needed to understand when the political economy incentives (in a 
way the demand for regional public goods) can be catered for so as to result in optimal supply 
of regional public goods.
61 
 
There is also little evidence on the impact of the most successful regional integration 
agreements to guide policy makers on which regional trade facilitation policies may be 
desirable. In particular, the study of existing regional agreements could bear some lessons on 
whether there is a case for gradual approach, for prioritizing specific trade facilitation 
regional public goods, leaving others for later and building upon that basis as seems to have 
been the case in Europe. 
 
Strong institutions are required. The crucial role played by institutions governing regional 
trade liberalization efforts must be emphasized. Their role seems to matter as much – if not 
more – in the implementation of the soft law aspects of reform than of hard rules. We 
highlighted the importance of cooperation and joint regulatory design to deliver regional trade 
facilitation solutions. This also highlights an area of comparative advantage of regional 
approaches over multilateral ones. Weak institutions also are not well equipped to manage 
heavy implementation challenges. 
 
Regional institutions also need to be strong enough to push what are difficult reforms: 
customs unions seem relatively more efficient. Emphasis should be shifted from rules to 
implementation, with flexibility in mind, and possibly complementarity with other national or 
multilateral approaches. This may mean strengthening regional specialist organization, 
eventually in partnership with the private sector, which have tended to be more successful in 
cooperation agreement or maintaining working groups of experts. Finally, Customs unions 
have fared better than other forms of regional cooperation in many respects. Admittedly, 
customs unions are few, and forming a customs union requires a serious amount of political 
will on all sides: these are naturally good conditions for regional trade facilitation reforms too.
                                            
60 Helping the RTA to maintain the level of trade with third parties to its pre integration level, otherwise known as 
the Kemp-Wan (1976) proposition. 
61 For instance how exactly is coordination delivered? What makes countries that would compete with each other 
for the supply of trade facilitation infrastructure change their mind? 
  34References 
 
Al-Atrash, Hassan and Tarik Yousef, 2000. “Intra-Arab Trade: Is It Too Little?”, IMF 
Working Paper No. 00/10, Washington: International Monetary Fund. 
Anderson, James E. and Eric van Wincoop, 2002. “Borders, Trade and Welfare”, in Dani 
Rodrik and Susan Collins (eds.),  Brookings Trade Forum 2001, Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution, 2002. 
Arce, Daniel G., and Todd Sandler, 2002. Regional Public Goods: Typologies, Provision, 
Financing, and Development Assistance. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International for 
Exert Group on Development Issues, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Arndt, Channing, Xavier Cirera, Lawrence Edwards, Frank Flatters, Robert Kirk, Mareike 
Meyn, Thomas Rutherford, Matthew Stern, and Christopher Stevens (2007). Evaluation of An 
Appropriate Model for a SADC Customs Union, Report commissioned by the SADC 
Secretariat, final draft, 7 August 2007.  
Arvis, Jean-Francois, Gael Raballand and Jean-Francois Marteau, 2007. “The Cost of Being 
Landlocked: Logistics Costs and Supply Chain Reliability”, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 4258. 
Arvis, Jean-Francois, 2005. “Transit and the Special Case of Landlocked Countries” chapter 
11 in Luc De Wulf and Jose B. Sokol (eds) Customs Modernization Handbook, Washington 
DC: World Bank. 
Baldwin, Richard, 2000. Regulatory Protectionism, Developing Nations and a Two-Tier 
World Trade System, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 
Bergsten, Fred, 1997. "Open Regionalism", World Economy, 20: 545-65. 
Bin, Peng and Maria Misovicova, 2007. Trade Facilitation Provisions in Regional Trade 
Agreements in Asia and the Pacific, mimeo UN Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific. 
Caron, Jim and Heidi Reichert, 2001. East Africa Subregion: Enhancing Transportation 
Management to Foster U.S. Agricultural Trade Opportunities, Washington DC: Agricultural 
Marketing Service, US Department of Agriculture. 
COMESA, 2005. COMESA’s Practical Experience on Trade Facilitation in Relation to 
Regional Economic Integration and Development, paper presented at the “Expert Meeting on 
Trade Facilitation as Engine for Development”, Geneva Switzerland, 21-23 Septembre 2005. 
Consilium Legis, 2003. Transport and Trade Facilitation: East and Southern Africa: Review 
of Present Problems and Reform Initiatives, final report volume 1, Washington DC: The 
World Bank. 
Cook, Lisa D. and Jeffrey Sachs, 1999. Regional public goods in international assistance, in 
Kaul, I., Grunberg, I. and Stern, M., (Eds.), Global public goods: international cooperation in 
the 21st century, 436−449. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Devlin, Robert and Antoni Estevadeordal, 2004. “Trade and Cooperation: A Regional Public 
Goods Approach”, in Antoni Estevadeordal, Brian Frantz and Tam Robert Nguyen (eds.) 
Regional Public Goods, Washington DC: Interamerican Development Bank and ADB. 
  35De Wulf, Luc and Jose B. Sokol, 2005. Customs Modernization Handbook, Washington DC: 
World Bank. 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 2003. Regional Trade 
Facilitation Programme: Fostering Transition Through Documentary Credit, Evaluation 
Department, EBRD. 
European Commission (EC), 1989. Working Document of the Commission Services on the 
Customs Union in the Context of the Internal Market, SEC(89) 1942, Brussels: European 
Commission. 
European Commission (EC), 2003. Communication from the commission to the council, the 
European parliament and the European economic and social committee a simple and 
paperless environment for customs and trade, COM(2003) 452, Brussels: European 
Commission. 
Ferroni, Marco, 2002. “Regional Public Goods in Official Development Assistance”, 
INT/INTAL Working Paper, Washington D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank. 
Finger, Michael J., 2006. “Aid for Trade: How We Got Here, Where We Might Go”, ILEAP 
Background Brief No. 10. 
Ghana National Development Planning Commission, 2005. Growth and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (GPRS II) (2006-2009), Republic of Ghana, November. 
Hirshleifer, Jack, 1983. “From Weakest-Link to Best-Shot: The Voluntary Provision of Public 
Goods.” Public Choice, 3:271-286. 
Hoekman, Bernard and Michel Kostecki, 2000. The Political Economy of the World Trade 
System, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Holmes, Peter, Leornado Iacovone, Rungroge Kamondetdacha, and Lara Newson, 2006. 
“Capacity Building to Meet International Standards as Public Goods”, UNIDO Working 
Papers. 
Kaul, Inge, Pedro Conceição, Katell Le Goulven and Ronald U. Mendoza, 2003. Providing 
Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kanbur, Ravi, Todd Sandler, and Kevin M. Morrison, 1999. “The future of development 
assistance: Common pools and international public goods”, Overseas Development Council 
Policy Essay No. 25, Washington, DC. 
Keen, Michael, 2003. Changing Customs: Challenges and Strategies for the Reform of 
Customs Administration, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Keen, Michael, and Alejandro Simone, 2004, “Tax policy in Developing Countries: Some 
Lessons from the 1990s, and Some Challenges Ahead” in Sanjeev Gupta, Benedict Clements, 
and Gabriela Inchauste (eds.): Helping Countries Develop: The Role of the Fiscal Policy. 
Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Kemp, Murray C. and Henry Y. Wan Jr, 1976. “An Elementary Proposition Concerning the 
Formation of Customs Unions”, Journal of International Economics, 6: 95-97. 
Kimura, Fukunari and Hyun-Hoon Lee, 2006. The Gravity Equation in International Trade in 
Services, Review of world economics, 142(1): 92-121. 
  36Mattoo, Aadittya and Carsten Fink, 2002. “Regional Trade Agreement and Services: Policy 
Issues”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2852. 
Maur, Jean-Christophe, 2005. “Exporting Europe’s Trade Policy”, The World Economy, 
28(11): 1565-1590. 
Mc Linden, Gerard, 2006. Needs, Priorities and Costs Associated with Technical Assistance 
and Capacity Building for Implementation of a WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement: A 
Comparative Study Based on Six Developing Countries, Washington DC: World Bank. 
Mc Tiernan, Andrew, 2006. Customs and Business in Africa: A Better Way Forward 
Together, draft report prepared for Business Action for Improving Customs Administration in 
Africa (BAFICAA). 
Moïsé, Evdokia, 2002. The Relationship Between Regional Trade Agreements and 
Multilateral Trading System: Trade Facilitation, OECD Working Party of the Trade 
Committee TD/TC/WP(2002)17/FINAL. 
Moïsé, Evdokia, 2005. “Trade Facilitation Reforms in the Service of Development: Country 
Case Studies”, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 12, Paris: OECD. 
Müller-Jentsch, Daniel, 2003. “Transport Policies for the Euro-Mediterranean Free-Trade 
Area: An Agenda for Multimodal Transport Reform in the Southern Mediterranean”, World 
Bank Technical Paper No. 527.  
National Board of Trade, 2003. Trade Facilitation From a Developing Country Perspective, 
Kommerscollegium/National Board of Trade: Stockholm. 
N’Guessan N’Guessan, 2003. La problématique de la gestion intégrée des corridors en 
Afrique, Document d’analyse SSATP No. 3F, Programme de politiques de transport en 
Afrique subsaharienne Banque mondiale et Commission économique pour l’Afrique. 
OECD, 2005. A Review of Past Technical Assistance and Capacity Building Initiatives for 
Trade Facilitation, OECD DAC Project on Trade Facilitation phase I, Paris, OECD. 
Otsuki, Tsunihero, John Wilson, and Mirvat Sewadeh, 2001. “What price precaution? 
European harmonisation of aflatoxin regulations and African groundnut exports”, European 
Review of Agricultural Economics, 28(3): 263-284.  
Portes, Richard and Hélène Rey, 2005. The Determinants of Cross-Border Equity Flows, 
Journal of International Economics, 65: 269-296. 
Röschlau, F. 2003. “Double Standards Cause Regional Transport Nightmares”, e-corridor, 
Walvis Bay Corridor Group, number 3. 
Roy, Jayanta and Shweta Bagai, 2005. “Key Issues in Trade Facilitation: Summary of World 
Bank/ EU Workshops in Dhaka and Shanghai in 2004”, Policy Research Working Paper 
3703. World Bank, Development Research Group, Trade, Washington, D.C. 
Rufin, Carlos, 2004. “Regional Public Goods and Infrastructure”, in A. Estevadeordal, B. 
Frantz and T. R. Nguyen (eds), Regional Public Goods: From Theory to Practice, 
Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank.  
Sandler, Todd, 1998. “Global and regional public goods: A prognosis for collective action”, 
Fiscal Studies 19: 221-247. 
  37  38
Sandler, Todd, 2006. “Regional Public Goods and International Organizations”, Review of 
International Organizations, 1(1), March 2006. 
Sauvé, Pierre and Americo B. Zampetti, 2000. “Subsidiarity Perspectives on the New Trade 
Agenda”, Journal of International Economic Law, 3(1): 83-114. 
Schiff, Maurice, 2001. Will the “Natural Trading Partner” Please Stand Up? Journal of 
Economic Integration, 16(2): 245-62. 
Schiff, Maurice and L. Alan Winters, 1998. “Regional Integration as Diplomacy”, World 
Bank Economic  Review, 12: 271-295. 
Schiff, Maurice and L. Alan Winters, 2002. “Regional Cooperation and the Role of 
International Organizations and Regional Integration”, Policy Research Working Paper 2872. 
World Bank, Development Research Group, Trade, Washington, D.C. 
Schiff, Maurice and L. Alan Winters, 2003. Regional Integration and Development, 
Washington DC: The World Bank. 
Stålgren, Patrick, 2000. “Regional Public Goods and the Future of International Development 
Co-operation: A Review of the Literature on Regional Public Goods”, Expert Group on 
Development Issues Working Paper 2000: 2, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 
Sweden. 
Mozambique DTIS, 2004. Removing Obstacles to Economic Growth in Mozambique: A 
Diagnostic Trade Integration Study, volume 2 main report, Integrated Framework, Geneva: 
WTO.  
Tanzania DTIS, 2005. Tanzania: Diagnostic Trade Integration Study: Volume 1, Integrated 
Framework, Geneva: WTO. 
Uganda DTIS, 2006. Uganda: Diagnostic Trade Integration Study: Volume 1, Integrated 
Framework, Geneva: WTO. 
Wilson, John S., Catherine Mann, Yuen Pau Woo, Nizar Assanie, and Inbom Choi, 2002. 
Trade Facilitation: A Development Perspective in the Asia Pacific Region, APEC. 
World Bank, 2004. The World Bank’s Trade Logistics Initiative: From Country Awareness to 
Global Advocacy, from International Debate to Local Implementation, September 2004. 
World Bank, 2005. “Beyond Trade Policy Barriers: Lowering Trade Costs Together”, 
Chapter 4 in Global Economic Prospects 2005: Trade, Regionalism and Development, 
Washington DC: The World Bank. 
World Customs Organization (WCO), 1995. Glossary of International Customs Terms, 
Brussels: WCO. 
Yang, Yongzheng and Sanjeev Gupta, 2005. “Regional Trade Agreements in Africa: Past 
Performance and the Way Forward”, IMF Working Paper WP/05/36. 